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Children's Rights vs. Adult Free Speech:
Can They Be Reconciled?

NADINE STROSSEN
I'm delighted to participate in this important symposium.
It is a wonderful tribute to the memory of Milton Sorokin, who did
so much to promote the First Amendment. I'm truly sorry I never had
the pleasure of meeting him in person. It has been most inspiring,
though, to meet his lifelong partner in law and in life, Ethel Sorokin.
Despite my own passionate commitment to the First Amendment, I
have to engage in lots of self-censorship to comply with our time limits
for our opening presentations! Tonight's timely topic is so broad that I
can only discuss a small facet of it in such a short time. I decided that
the particular facet that would be the most timely and interesting is the
very hot topic of censorship of the Interet. This is the most current
specific context in which tonight's broad question is being debated.
In the asserted interest of protecting children from "indecent' and
"patently offensive" expression in eyberspace, Congress passed the
Communications Decency Act or "CDA"' in February, 1996. No sooner
was the ink dry on President Clinton's signature, on February 8, 1996,
than the ACLU went to court to challenge it on behalf of not only ourselves, but also a large, diverse coalition of other providers and users

* Professor of Law, New York Law School; President,American CMI Liberties Union. For
research assistance ith this essay, Professor Strossen would like to thank her Chief Aide,
Raafat S. Toss. This essay is based on Professor Strossen's oral preicntation at the Third Annual Symposium sponsored by The Center for First Amendment Rlghts, at the Universto of
Connecticut Law School, on April 30, 1996. The uritten version has been updated to reflect
szgnificant intervening legal developments-most irportant ; the June 12, 1996 decision of the
three:judgefederal court in ACLU v. Reno, holding the Communications Decency Act unconsiltutlonaL
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §223 (a) to (h)).
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of on-line information.
Even though Congress passed the law by overwhelming margins
(the votes were 414-16 in the House and 91-5 in the Senate), many
members of Congress recognized that it had severe constitutional flaws.
The CDA itself therefore set up a special, expedited judicial procedure
for constitutional challenges to it. It provided for a special three-judge
federal court and a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
On June 12, 1996, the lower court issued a unanimous decision in
ACLU v. Reno,2 holding that the CDA violates the First Amendment.
While each judge wrote a separate opinion and reached somewhat differing issues and conclusions, they all celebrated the importance of free
speech in cyberspace and condemned the CDA's breach of it, in strong
and eloquent language. Considered together, the three opinions adopted
almost all of our many, independently sufficient, arguments in support
of the conclusion that the CDA is unconstitutional. One of the three
judges, Stewart Dalzell, even went so far as to explain that not only
the CDA itself, but also any law restricting the content of cyber-communications, would be unconstitutional.3
In response to this lower court ruling, President Clinton promptly
reiterated his view that the CDA was constitutional, and the Justice
Department appealed to the Supreme Court. The high Court's ruling
will be issued before the end of its next term, by late June or early
July 1997.
Although the CDA and ACLU v. Reno involve the newest communications medium, they also raise this Symposium's age-old questions
about protecting children and free speech, which have arisen with respect to every communications medium throughout history. The major
asserted rationale for censoring cyberspace is to protect children from
access to materials their parents don't want them to see-in particular,
sexually-oriented material.
Mike Godwin, General Counsel of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (one of our co-plaintiffs in ACLU v. Reno), has trenchantly observed that Americans are always nervous about technology, about
children, and about sex; therefore, when all three come together, as
they do in the "cyberporn" context, they make us extremely nervous!4
Indeed, some of the "discussion" about sexually-oriented expression in
2. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
3. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 865.

4. See, e.g., Scott W. Wright, Onramp Drops Limits on Sex Sites, AUSu-AIERIcAN
STATESMAN, July 13, 1995.
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cyberspace, including the Congressional debate that culminated in the
CDA, would more accurately be labeled "hype" or "hysteria." For example, last summer's massive press and political attack on
"cyberporn"---which led to the Senate's overwhelming passage of the
bill that ultimately became the CDA-was heralded by lurid images of
children being unwittingly bombarded by sexual images on the computer screen. Time Magazine's July 3, 1995 cover, for instance, featured a
horror-stricken, zombie-like child mesmerized by a computer screen.
The headline blared: "CYBERPORN: EXCLUSIVE: A New Study
Shows How Pervasive and Wild it Really Is. Can We Protect Our
Kids-and Free Speech?"5 One of the article's graphics depicted a man
having sex with a computer. Yet the alleged "study" that triggered this
over-reaction was promptly and widely debunked, and the author of the
Time cover story apologized for it.'
Certainly the goal of protecting our nation's young people is both
laudable and important. But cyber-censorship, while assertedly serving
this purpose, actually suffers the same double-flaw that characterizes all
censorship measures: it is both unprincipled and ineffective. All censorship schemes are touted as advancing some important public purpose,
such as protecting children or other groups in our society. In fact,
though, censorship always masks and diverts us from the actual underlying societal problems and the constructive solutions to them. It allows
politicians to offer the public a purported "quick fix" to pressing social
problems, which in fact fixes nothing at all.
Cyber-censorship is no exception to this general pattern. It violates
not only the rights of the assertedly benefited children, but also the
rights of adults, all without doing anything meaningful for children's
welfare. The CDA deprives parents of the right to shape the upbringing
of their own children by making their own decisions as to what material their children will or will not be allowed to see. It also deprives
older and mature minors of their own First Amendment freedoms,
which the Supreme Court recognized in the landmark case of Tinker v.
Des Moines School District.! (I'm very proud that the ACLU represented the students in this historic case.) In Tinker, the Court upheld First
Amendment rights of students in not only senior high school, but also
junior high school. In fact, our lead plaintiff, Mary Beth Tinker, was
5. Philip Elmer-Dewlt, CyBerporn: Exclus'e: A New Study Shows How Perras'eand Wild
itReally Is. Can We Protect Our lads-andFree Speech? TIIF, July 3, 1995, at 38.
6. Phillip Elmer-De Witt,lFre Storm on the Computer Nets, TCE, July 24, 1995.
7. 393 US. 503 (1969).
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only 13 years old at the time in question. Yet the Court strongly affirmed the free speech rights even of such young people, even in the
school context. It declared: "It cannot be argued that. .. students...
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse
gate.133
The Communications Decency Act infringes the free speech rights
of not only junior and senior high school students but, worse yet, of
college students too. Its ban applies directly to all minors--everyone
under eighteen. Yet 123,000 college students in this country are under
eighteen.9
Moreover, the CDA also deprives all adults of the right to decide
what they will or won't look at; all of us are relegated to seeing only
the material that the government deems fit for some children. Due to
the nature of online communications, many content providers simply
have no technologically or economically feasible way of screening out
minors. That's true, for example, for all nonprofit organizations. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the CDA operates as a total
criminalization of all "indecent" or "patently offensive" speech, even
for adults.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned such an approach as
unconstitutional, in the context of other media. For example, back in
1957, the Court unanimously struck down a Michigan statute that made
it an offense to make available to the general public any book or other
publication with a potentially adverse impact on minors."0 The Court
condemned the law in memorable words, which are fully applicable to
the CDA as well: "The State insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading public ...

in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is...

promot[ing] the general welfare. Surely, this is to bum the house to
roast the pig." In ACLU v. Reno, Judge Dalzell built upon the same
metaphor, denouncing the CDA's censorship of the Internet because it
"burned the global village to roast the pig."'2
This is also precisely the point that Newt Gingrich made during the
summer of 1995 in speaking out against the CDA. Unfortunately, he
ultimately joined the overwhelming majority of his colleagues who

8. Id at 506.
9. See ACLU v. Reno, Petitioner's Brief, available
http'/www.aclu.org/court/exonote.hm.
10. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
11. Id at 383.
12. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

in

ACLU

Websito
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voted for the CDA. Still, his indictment of it stands unrefuted. He said:
It's clearly a violation of free speech and it's a violation of the
right of adults to communicate with each other .... I don't
think it's a serious way to discuss a serious issue, which is,
how do you maintain the right of fe speech for adults while
also 1protecting
children in a medium which is available to
3
both?
In answer to Newt Gingrich's question, we can in fact maintain
adults' free speech rights while also protecting children in this medium
which is available to both. I've already explained that censorship in
fact subverts both of these goals. Conversely, non-censorial approaches
promote both of them.
Specifically, there are an increasing range of software programs that
allow individual parents to monitor and block their children's access to
whatever they don't want their children to see. 4 Many such software
programs are already available and are becoming more sophisticated,
and easier to use, every day. Some examples of these cleverly named
programs are Net Nanny, Surfwatch, Cybersitter, and Cypberpatrol.
Some of this software can be activated by a phone call, so that even
computer-illiterate parents can take advantage of it. And there is even
software that automatically shuts down computers if children get certain
questions that indicate their safety might be jeopardized-for example,
"What's your name?"; "What's your address?"; or "Are your parents
home?" 15
One of our expert witnesses at trial was a director of the MIT
Computer Laboratories, who is working on something called "PICS,"
the Platform for Internet Content Selection. This will allow any individual or organization to rate on-line material, and allow parents to block
according to rating systems that reflect their own values. Parents could,
for example, use ratings provided by the Boy Scouts, Parents Magazine, the Christian Coalition, or People for the American Way-what-

13. Edmund L Andrews, Gingrich Opposes Smut Rule for Inferner, N.Y.IiRs, June 21,
1995, at A20.
14. I don't mean to suggest that the rights of minors would almays be subordinate to those
of their parents. The ACLU has defended rights of mature minors to make certain basic choices, including the decision to terminate a pregnancy, independent of their parents. But potentially
difficult questions about determining the relative weight of parents' and minors' rights don't
arise in considering the constitutionality of the CDA, since it violates the rights of both parents
and their children.
15. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 839 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1996).
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ever they choose.
On cross-examination, the government's own expert witness conceded that the PICS approach is more effective than the CDA in helping
parents to shield their children from material they deem inappropriate
for any reason. The CDA depends on content providers to do their own
rating and blocking, focusing only on "indecent" and "patently offensive" material. Parents might understandably find these self-ratings less
helpful than those that are done by third parties--especially expert
organizations whose views and values the parents share. Moreover,
under the PICS system, parents could block whatever material they feel
is inappropriate, far beyond the sexual realm that is the focus of the
CDA. For example, parents could block certain violent, religious, or
political expression that is inconsistent with their own values or approach to raising their children.
The CDA is also completely ineffective in dealing with the large
and growing number of on-line content providers that are based outside
the U.S. They are not subject to the CDA at all, and hence can't be
expected to engage in any rating or blocking. At the time of the trial
in ACLU v. Reno, during the spring of 1996, 40% of all Internet sites
already were foreign-based, and that number was expected to soon hit
50%.16 By contrast, user-based technologies such as Surfwatch and
PICS can effectively block foreign sites. Under PICS, for example, a
parent could choose simply to block all unrated sites.
For all of these reasons, the CDA fails one of the two basic First
Amendment requirements for any law that suppresses speech based on
its content: it is not the least restrictive means for advancing the
government's asserted interest. The CDA also fails the second of these
two fundamental First Amendment requirements: it does not promote a
government interest of compelling importance. The government has
merely asserted that there is a compelling interest in shielding minors
from indecent or patently offensive expression-whatever that might be.
However, throughout the lower court proceedings, it didn't offer even a
shred of evidence that minors are actually harmed by exposure to such
material.
In contrast, we offered much evidence that these vague epithets
cover a vast range of material that not only is not harmful, but to the
contrary, is valuable to minors, especially older minors. This includes
much information that could be very beneficial in terms of minors'

16. kd at 848.
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health, safety, welfare, and even life itself. This is true, for example, of
information about safer sex, given the high percentage of teenagers who
are sexually active and the epidemic among them of sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS. Another important example is information
about contraception, given the large number of unwanted teen pregnancies in the U.S. Additionally, in light of the tragically high number of
suicides among lesbian and gay teenagers, on-line information about
homosexuality, and on-line forums that allow young gay people to
communicate with each other, can literally constitute life-lines for them.
One final example of information that could well be branded "indecent"
and "patently offensive," but which could preserve the mental and
physical health of young people, is information about sexual abuse. Too
many children are victimized precisely because they lack information
about the nature of sexual abuse and about what steps they can take to
protect themselves against it.
Some of the many valuable aspects of sexually-oriented cyber-communications, specifically from the viewpoint of children, were summarized by my New York Law School colleague, Professor Carlin Meyer,
as follows:
[W]e should accept cybersex as an opportunity for our youth to
anonymously explore, in the privacy of their rooms and in the
anonymity of conversation in which they are both invisible and
unknown, what other children and adolescents are feeling and
thinking about their bodies and sexuality. Rather than focusing,
as the mainstream media does, on the lone pedophile who lures
children into close encounters of unsavory kinds, we should
remember that it is far less likely that pedophiles will succeed
in luring children via the Internet than in a local park. If we
encourage children to talk about their growing and changing
bodies; about physical contact with others (or the lack of it);
about differences between the sexes; and about advances from
teachers, priests, and relatives, we are likely to protect them not
only from the relatively uncommon stranger-pedophile but also
from the far more ordinary scourge of intrafamilial incest.'7
For all of the reasons I've laid out, the alleged desire to shield
children from certain material falls flat as a rationale for curbing con-

17. Caulin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from from the Pornographers,33 G3EO. L. J. 1969, 2007
(1995).
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tent in cyberspace. What's really at stake here, as is so often the case
in these censorship crusades, is the desire to deprive adults of access to
that material too. When I debated Christian Coalition Executive Director Ralph Reed on this issue on CNN's "Crossfire" last summer, he
essentially admitted as much. He said he wanted to make cyberspace
"family friendly," thus raising the spectre of imposing "traditional family values" on everyone in the U.S. This point was made by an article
in The American Spectator (interestingly, a conservative journal):
Ralph Reed grew so testy on "Crossfire" that he accused
Nadine Strossen of advocating "bestiality." The ACLU President, of course, had done no such thing, and it may be that
Reed was angry because only minutes before he had been made
to look foolish and perhaps even sinister. Michael Kinsley had
asked him whether he wanted to keep smut away from adults
as well as from children. Reed gave an ambiguous answer, and
so Kinsley asked him again. In fact, he repeated the question
three times, but Reed remained ambiguous."8
The tendency to use a purported protection of children as a
smokescreen for directly curbing adults' rights is accompanied by blatant hypocrisy as far as children themselves are concerned. Politicians
are eager to cite their devotion to children as an excuse for limiting the
free speech (as well as other) rights of young and old alike. But they
are far less eager to adopt constructive measures that will actually advance young people's current well-being or future prospects.
Our recent budget-slashing frenzy in the U.S. has been particularly
devastating to education. Also prominent on the budgetary choppingblock have been all programs to benefit poor women and their children,
including those that advance health and nutrition. A study released last
summer revealed that poor children in the U.S. are poorer than the
children in most other Western industrialized nations. 9 In the U.S.,
proportionately more children live in poverty than in other affluent
poor children in America get the least governcountries.2" Moreover,
21
ment assistance.

18. John Corry, Salhy V-Chips, THa A1macAN SPECTATOR, Sept. 1995, at 43.
19. Calvin Milam, Treasury Secretary Outlines Economic Plan for Revitaliing Inner Cities,
CrrY NEws SarV. OF L.A., July 29, 1996 (discussing 1996 study by the Organzation for Economic Cooperation and Development.)
20. See id
21. See ta
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Let me cite just one example of the many prominent politicians
who assert their concern for children as an alleged justification for
censorship that violates rights of children and adults alike, while simultaneously opposing constructive measures that would provide real protection to children. Last summer, then-Senate Majority Leader and Republican Presidential contender Bob Dole gave a well-publicized speech
assailing violence in the media and its asserted negative impact on our
nation's youth.' Yet, while Dole is thus leading the charge to ban
images of guns from TV, he has also led the charge to repeal the recently-enacted ban on real assault weapons on the streetl
This misplaced focus on images as the purported problem, and
censorship as the vaunted solution-I want to stress again-is typical of
all advocates of all forms of censorship. It also crosses all party and
ideological lines. I cite Bob Dole only as an important illustration of a
much broader pattern. His Presidential rival, Bill Clinton, has also crusaded against media images, also citing a concern for children.
One of the major reasons why the ACLU has always been a nonpartisan organization is precisely because violations of civil liberties
cross all other lines. Censorship for the ostensible benefit of children-including cyber-censorship---is no exception. Very few members
of Congress, in either party, voted against the CDA, and both President
Clinton and Vice President Gore have championed it.
Just as civil liberties violations cross party and ideological lines, the
same is true of adherence to civil liberties. Some of the strongest opponents of cyber- and other forms of censorship are Republicans and
conservatives. After all, isn't it a conservative premise to minimize the
role of government in our lives? And shouldn't the government's role
be especially small in our living rooms, our bedrooms, and the other
private places where we and our children use our computers? I'd like
to end by sharing one of my favorite E-mails I've ever received, because it illustrates this important general point in the particular context
of cyberliberties. I received it from a supporter of the Christian Coalition after she saw my "Crossfire" debate against Christian Coalition
Executive Director Ralph Reed; to my pleasant surprise, though, she
was completely on my side. She wrote:
Dear Nadine Strossen,
I am a mother of two, Christian pro-lifer .... As you can

22. Bob Dole, "Hollywood" speecb, L.A. May 31, 1995, In COLLECTED SPEECHz,JA.Ocr. 1995, FED. Doc. CLEAiNG Hous.
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imagine, I have very rarely agreed with the ACLU, until now.
I saw you on Crossfire. You knew what you were talking
about ....
I don't like pornographic material, or some of the
[other] speech on the net, but the First Amendment says that it
can be there just as much as I can.
I have e-mailed Mr. Reed, the 700 Club and Newt to let
them know how I feel. The internet is like computer cable. If
you don't want it, don't subscribe to it. If you do but don't
want the kids to see all of it then get the freeware of
SURFWATCH. It is my responsibility to take care of my kids,
not the government. We the voters said that in the last election ....
I know this is a very strange letter to get, and even stranger to write, knowing both our stands on issues, but I wanted
you to know that not all Christians want to be Big Brother. We
are told to be caring and show by our lives the peace Jesus
gives us. The action of many Christians today doesn't show
that. This makes me very sad, because it only hurts the cause
of Christ ....
She then ends, as I will, by paraphrasing a famous quote from
Voltaire, which is one of my favorites too: "I may not agree with you,
but I will defend to the death your right to say it."

23. The original phrase in French philosopher Voltaire's essay on Tolerance is 'Idisapprove
of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." See TH DiCnoNARY
OF QUOTATIONS 351 (Robert Andrews, ed. 1993).

Children and the First Amendment

STANLEY FISH'

For the question "can children's rights and free speech be reconciled?" I would like to substitute another question: "can education and
free speech be reconciled?" and I would like to answer with a simple
"No!" Now of course I don't mean "no"' as a matter of empirical report-we do have a First Amendment and we do have education, so in
some important sense they are reconcilable-rather I mean 'no" as a
matter of philosophical logic. If you assume (as most commentators do)
that one of the important values supported by the First Amendment is
freedom of choice, you will be suspicious of any form of instruction
whose intention or effect is to indoctrinate rather than to illuminate.
That is why the Association of American University Professors, the
self-anointed guardian of academic freedom, has always looked askance
at religiously-based colleges and universities; for rather than being committed to the disinterested play of ideas, they turn out to be very interested in the promulgation of some ideas and in the exclusion of some
others. Such institutions, the AAUP declared in its 1915 statement of
principles, should be allowed to exist, but they should not be allowed
to "sail under false colors" as true centers of education, for "[genuine
boldness and thoroughness of inquiry, and freedom of speech, are
scarcely reconcilable with the prescribed inculcation of a particular
opinion ....'"
"Inculcation" might be thought of as a prophetic word here since it
will figure prominently in those First Amendment cases that address the
rights and needs of children. "Inculcate!' means "to teach by forceful
urging, to instill" and the question debated in these cases is, first,

* Arts and Sciences Professor of English and Professor of Law, Duke Unf'ersml
1. General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and .4cademic Tenure (1915),
53 LAW & CONm.
PROBS. 393, 394 (1990).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:883

whether or not it is a good thing to have education without inculcation-education that stops short of instilling anything except, perhaps,
the conviction that nothing is to be instilled-and, second, whether or
not it is a possible thing to have education without inculcation. To both
these questions liberalism-by which I mean not a set of specific policies but a theory of government which requires the state to maintain
neutrality in the face of competing moral visions-answers "yes." Education without inculcation is the American way because it allows students to make up their minds and decide for themselves, without the
pressure of orthodoxy and authority.
The point is made vigorously and with an easy confidence in these
oft-cited sentences from a 1967 case, Keyishian v. Board of Regents:2
The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The
nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out
of a multitude of tongues rather than through any kind of authoritative selection.' 3
But this cannot mean what it says; for without "authoritative selection,"
education, whether public or private, would be impossible. As one
commentator has observed, elected and appointed representatives of the
state control almost all aspects of public education, the membership of
school boards, the selection and accreditation of teachers, the purchasing of texts, the design of the curriculum, the administration of tests,
the granting of degrees, the form and content of ceremonies, and on
and on 4 Moreover, not only is the requirement of "no authoritative
selection" impossible so long as education is, in any sense, organized,
it also runs up against the competing requirement-which goes without
saying but is often said-that education prepares students to participate
usefully in the business of a democratic society by instilling in them
the appropriate democratic values. Here is an early statement by Noah
Webster: "Education ... forms the moral characters of men, and morals are the basis of government. Education should therefore be the first
care of a legislature" and "should be watched with the most scrupulous

2. Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589
(1967).
3. Id at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943)).
4. See David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against
Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx L. Rsv., 477, 497 (1981).
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attention."5
It would seem, then, that the ideal of education without inculcation
suffers from two fatal defects; either it is an ideal compromised the
moment the first lesson plan is implemented (for then "authoritative
selection" will have already occurred) or it is an ideal at odds with the
very reason for having a system of education in the first place (the
fashioning of good citizens). The answer to either of the questions I
posed a few moments ago-is "education without inculcation possible?"
and "is education without inculcation a good thing?"-would seem to
be "no." And if the answer to both of these questions is no, then the
answer to the question posed by the original title of our panel---"Protection of Children and the First Amendment: are they Compatible?" is also "no"; for since it is precisely the purpose of education to
protect children from bad-i.e. undemocratic-ideas by introducing
them forcefully (an adverb that hovers nicely between a style of emphasis and coercion) to good ideas. This purpose cannot be carried out
without compromising a child's First Amendment rights, traditionally
thought to include the right to form one's own opinions, to make up
one's own mind, and to have unrestricted access to information, opinions and expressions of belief. In short, if there is no education without
inculcation, then there is no education that is compatible with the First
Amendment and its preferred metaphor of the marketplace of ideas.
Now, I am not the first person to have posed the dilemma in these
terms, and theorists of liberal education have devised a spirited reply to
formulations like mine. Here is what they typically say. It may be that
education cannot proceed without inculcation, but not all efforts at
inculcation are the same; nor are their effects. Surely there is a difference between the inculcation aimed at by a regime that pronounces
certain views orthodox and beyond challenge and one that welcomes all
points of view to the table so long as they submit themselves to the
interrogation of rational deliberation. And isn't the difference that in
this second regime, inculcation, rather than undermining autonomy and
the freedom of democratic choice, invites students to exercise and grow
in them? In the words of two recent commentators, a curriculum that
introduces students to many points of view without authorizing any
"encourage[s] them to think critically about the goals and values they
choose to pursue through life";6 "[b]y exposing the student to diverse
5. I at 499 (quoting Noah Webster, On the Education of Youth in Amerca, inTHE EA.LY
REPUBLIC 41, 64 (F. Rudolf el, 1965)).
6. Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limis on Government Authorl , to Incul-
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ideas... we build up his ability to engage in free inquiry and 7 critique, thus preparing him for future 'autonomous' decisionmaking."
The idea then is that the right kind of education, faithful to the
First Amendment, gives you practice in making up your own mind
about values and agendas, while the.wrong kind of education captures
your mind and binds it to values and agendas that go unexamined. The
problem with this idea is that it is itself an agenda informed by values
that are themselves unexamined and insulated from challenge. The
name of the agenda is "free and open inquiry" and despite that honorific self-description, it is neither free nor open because it is closed to
any line of thinking that would shut inquiry down or route it in a particular direction. It is closed, for example, to most forms of religious
thought (which it will stigmatize as dogmatic) or to any form of
thought that rules some point of view-for instance that the Holocaust
did not occur-beyond the pale and out of court. To put it in a way
that may seem paradoxical: openness is an ideology in that, like any
other ideology, it is slanted in some directions and blind (if not downright hostile) to others.
Now, to say that openness is an ideology is not necessarily to criticize it, much less reject it, but merely to deprive it of one of its
claims. Openness (or free inquiry) may still be the ideology we choose,
but if my analysis is right, we cannot choose it as an alternative to
ideology. What, after all, is the difference between a sectarian school
which disallows challenges to the divinity of Christ and a so-called
"non-ideological" school that disallows serious discussion of that same
question? In both contexts something goes without saying and something else cannot be said (Christ is not God or he is). There is of
course a difference, not however between a closed environment and an
open one, but between environments that are differently closed.
If this seems counterintuitive, consider the case of Mozert v.
Hawkins.' The cause of action was brought by Vicki Frost, a bornagain Christian mother of a sixth-grade child who had been assigned a
Holt-Rinehart text as part of a program in "critical reading." The books
used in this program, the court tells us, "are aimed at fostering a broad
tolerance for all of man's diversity," and, accordingly, "[tjhey intentioncafe Youth, 62 TEX L. REV. 197, 253 (1983).
7. Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Jus.

fifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorshp, 35 STAN. L. REv., 497, 517 (1983).
8. Mozert v. Hawkins, 582 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th
Cir. 1987). cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1987).
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ally expose... readers to a variety of religious beliefs, without attempting to suggest that one is better than another."' It was the contention of Mrs. Frost and the other parents who joined in her suit that the
free exercise rights of their children were infringed when they were required to study views that contradicted and undermined their most cherished convictions. In a series of trials and appeals, Frost and her colleagues were finally unsuccessful and what defeated them was the argument put forward by the superintendent of the Hawkins County school
district. He maintained that "plaintiffs misunderst[ood] the fact that exposure to something does not constitute teaching, indoctrination ...

or

promotion of the things exposed."'0
But what the superintendent and the judges who agreed with him
fail to understand in their turn is that the distinction between exposure
and indoctrination is an artifact of the very liberalism Vicki Frost rejects. That is, the distinction only makes sense if you assume, first, that
the mind is a cognitive machine that can always draw back from the
ideas presented to it and assess them by independent rational criteria;
second, that this is what the mind, if it is working properly, is supposed to do; and, third, that a conviction held in any other way, held
in conformity with authority rather than as the conclusion of a process
of critical reasoning, is not a conviction worth having. These are the
assumptions that underlie liberalism (Locke articulates them in A Letter
on Toleration"), liberal theories of education, and the First
Amendment, but they are decidedly not the assumptions of Vicki Frost
who doesn't care how her child comes to hold her beliefs so long as
they are not shaken, and who fears that they will be shaken if the
young girl is compelled to read and discuss the arguments of error.
When Vicki Frost hears someone invoke the distinction between exposure and indoctrination it doesn't sound to her like common sense, but
rather the presumptuous and arrogant attempt of a non-believer to prescribe for her the conditions and nature of her belief. The value assumed by the court that denied her relief-the value of developing the
ability to see the many sides of every question-is not only not her
value; it is in her eyes the way and vehicle of all evil.

9. Id. at 202.
10. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. or Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987).
11. Author: We will provide cite.
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Now there are two conclusions to be drawn from the Vicki Frost
example. The first is the conclusion that matters most to her: making
up your own mind independently of an external authority-be it state,
church, or bible-is an ideological program and a bad one. The second
is the conclusion that matters most to us on the occasion of this symposium: making up your mind independently of any external authority
is a program impossible to execute. If exposure is indoctrination, in the
sense that an idea introduced into the mind becomes part of its equipment, one of the lenses through which and with which the world is
processed and configured, then the declared goal of liberal education,
the goal of preparing students for "autonomous decisions making," is
not achievable and in fact has been rendered unavailable in the first
moment of consciousness. Indeed, if you think about it, the requirement
that people be allowed "to form their own opinions, beliefs, concepts,
hypotheses"' 2 makes no sense. You cannot form a belief in a vacuum,
in the absence of an already-in-place framework of norms, distinctions,
and hierarchies. And it cannot be you who puts that framework in
place, or who chooses it, for prior to its institution the notion of choice
could not possibly have a content. Indeed, you couldn't even have a
thought if the range of possible thoughts had not already been established and imprinted on your brain before you took your first mental
step. Just as you can't have education without authoritative selection, so
you can't have consciousness without authoritative selection, and one
you didn't make. According to one scholar, the First Amendment requires that one's beliefs be shaped by "one's own rational considerations rather than by... coercion."' 3 What I am saying is that this requirement is incoherent and cannot be met.
Because it cannot be met, the condition liberal education and the
First Amendment is supposed to save you from, the condition of being
subject to the influences of indoctrination, is the condition you are
always and already in. The choice is never between indoctrination and
free inquiry but between different forms of indoctrination issuing from
different authorities. Moreover, once you see this, the usual way of
talking about the relationship between the First Amendment and children gets stood on its head. Traditionally, the withholding from children of full First Amendment rights has been justified by what has
been assumed to be "a child's lack of capacity for 'autonomous'

12. van Geel, supra note 6, at 250.
13. Id at 253.
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choice:"' The reasoning has been that, until children mature and become capable of deciding for themselves, parents and educators (and
behind them, the state) must decide for them, at least in the area of
what they must study, how long they must study it, under what conditions, and with what restrictions on personal behavior, including, sometimes, verbal behavior. The problem with this line of reasoning is as
obvious as the contradiction between a regime of enforcement and its
declared goal of producing free agents. How can a course of study that
is designed to foreground some ideas and marginalize some others
produce young adults who are open to all ideas and capable of assessing them disinterestedly? The answer is that it cannot, and therefore the
theory of liberal education has a hole right in the middle of it since
there seems to be no way of getting to the desired state (autonomous
free choice) through the designated means (education).
John Stuart Mill, the great apostle of autonomy, saw this and did
not shrink from the conclusion it suggests: if you want to maximize
freedom of choice and opinion, education is not the solution but the
problem. Mill advises that we deal with the problem by removing the
state from direct control over education, for a "general state education
is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one another, and... the mold in which it casts them is that which pleases the
predominant power in the government."'" If the state has to be involved
in education, he says, it should be only as one competitor among many
others (how up-to-date and "1997" this is) so that the diversity we
prize will be reflected in our pedagogical institutions. Ideally, the
state's function should be limited to assuring the maintenance of high
standards and this it could best do by administering public examinations
which would not "exercise an improper influence over opinion" because
they would "be confined to facts and positive science exclusively."' 6
Mill instances as an example of what he has in mind the testing of a
student's knowledge of various religions-their tenets, their rituals-without in any way requiring him "to profess a belief in them."
Here it is again (or, rather, first), the dream of education without inculcation, this time to be realized by a program of instruction limited only
to the facts and therefore neutral. But the dream, and its imagined
realization, fade into gossamer before the onslaught, first, of the Vicki
14. State Indoctrlnation and the Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schook, supra note 7,
at 516.
15. JOHN STUART M4L, ON LMERY 98 (D. Spitz, New York, ed., 1975).
16. IM: at 99.
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Frost objection--exposure is indoctrination and will exercise an improper influence over my children-and, second, of the objection from epistemology-there are no facts without a framework and any framework
you have will have you in the sense of limiting in advance what you
can see and think. (There is also the objection Vicki Frost might make
if she thought of it, that a superficial or external knowledge of her religion was really no knowledge at all.) Even a minimalist educational
scheme constrains beliefs, and if you want to preserve freedom the only
alternative would seem to be no education at all. But even that option-granted reluctantly and as a one time exception to the Amish in
Wisconsin v. Yoder' 7 -wouldn't do the trick because in the absence of
formal education, the business of shaping, influencing, inculcating and
indoctrinating would be done by television, advertising, street gangs,
graffiti, and rock lyrics.
The bottom line conclusion is that freedom has always and already
been lost. The real problem is not that you can't get from education to
autonomous decision making (although that is certainly the case), but
that autonomous decision making is an unimaginable state. This is what
I meant when I said a moment ago that the usual way of talking about
children and the First Amendment must be stood on its head. If autonomy is compromised by the shaping force of culture, and if consciousness cannot exist without having a shape it did not choose, and if
our exposure to shaping forces increases as we get older, then what
adulthood and maturity bring is not more but less autonomy, and not
less but more indoctrination. Children are not a special case, and if
they are not a special case, the argument for subjecting them to inculcation becomes an argument for subjecting everyone. If care must be
taken lest children go down wrong paths in wayward directions, that
same care must be taken for adults who are no more capable of selfdirection than any first grader, and are indeed less capable because they
have been subject to more shaping influences. If indoctrination is necessary at any point, it is necessary forever, and the only question is from
whom shall we receive it.
Liberalism tells us that we shouldn't receive it from the state, but
the state is already dispensing it every time it invokes the First Amendment in the name of openness and freedom. This is exactly what Vicki
Frost objects to. She complains not that her child is being inculcated,
but that she is being inculcated in the name of values-diversity, crit-

17. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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ical thinking, flexibility of mind-she abhors. The court replies by
hitting her with those same values and telling her that she doesn't understand that exposure is not inculcation and that her daughter's freedom is in no way curtailed simply because she is required to read
certain texts. It would have been more honest (although politically inadvisable) to say to her "Right, inculcation is what we do in the service
of values we believe in and so long as we have the political power we
will continue to do it our way." (This is in essence what Justice
Stevens said in Employment Division v. Smith' to those Native Americans who insisted that peyote was an integral part of their religious
worship and that by penalizing them for its use the state denied them
free exercise.)
This brings me to a final point, one I have made in other venues:
the First Amendment is a political instrument; not an apolitical principle to which you can be faithful or unfaithful. It is a vocabulary and a
set of formulas which are conceptually incoherent, but which by virtue
of that very incoherence can be turned to the advantage of any policy
decision you might want implemented. Indeed, it is the incoherence of
First Amendment doctrine that makes it so useful. An incoherent doctrine is never going to frustrate your desires, for it will always be flexible enough to accommodate your agenda if you are skillful enough to
take advantage of its flexibility. I mean nothing cynical by this. I mean
only that the relationship between policy desires and so called "principles" is the reverse of what is usually maintained. The desires come
first and last, and the principles, appropriately tailored, piece out the
middle. The right way-no the only way-to proceed is to figure out
what you think should happen and then look around for principles,
First Amendment ones or any others, that will help you to get there.
Take the issue of school uniforms, one of the more recent chapters in
the history of the relationship between the First Amendment and
children's rights. Pundits earnestly wonder whether the gains in discipline and the blunting of potential conflict are worth the resulting constraints on creativity and free expression. But the appeal of uniforms is
precisely that they constrain creativity and expression in areas educators
find distracting. Rather than worrying about whether this appeal fits
with the requirements of the First Amendment they should be quarrying
the First Amendment-which to repeat is not a thing but a grab bag of
useful slogans and formulas-so as to fashion something noble sound-

18. Employment Div, Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
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ing that will fit with the appeal. It will be immediately said that this is
to allow outcomes to skew the process, to justify the means by the end,
to make the principle serve the policy and not the other way around.
But as Vicki Frost knows too well, that is what is always being done
and the only real issue is who gets to do it.

